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Abstract
We analyse the liberal ethics of non-interference applied to social
choice. Two liberal principles capturing non-interfering views of soci-
ety, inspired by J.S. Mill￿ s conception of liberty are examined, which
capture the idea that society should not penalise agents after changes
in their situation that do not a⁄ect others. Two paradoxes of liberal
approaches are highlighted. First, it is shown that a restricted view
of non-interference, as re￿ ected in the Individual Damage Principle,
together with some standard axioms in social choice leads straight to
welfare egalitarianism. Second, it is proved that every weakly paretian
social welfare ordering that satis￿es a general principle of noninterfer-
ence must be dictatorial. Both paradoxes raise important issues for
liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy.
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11 Introduction
Liberal approaches are prominent in political philosophy and in the social
sciences. Liberal principles in philosophy and social choice tend to express
some notion of individual autonomy or freedom. In Sen￿ s ([22]) seminal work
and the literature that it sparked, the core of liberalism is formalised as the
requirement that an individual has a sphere of complete control on society￿ s
preferences over minimal subsets of social states. Despite its intuitive ap-
peal, the latter axiom of minimal liberty con￿ icts with some other desirable
requirements of social orderings. In particular, as argued by Riley ([20]),
the essence of Sen￿ s impossibility result can be interpreted as identifying a
contradiction between the Pareto principle as a democratic rule (unanim-
ity) and a respect for absolute libertarian rights, given unrestricted domain.
Given the vast literature on liberal approaches originated from Sen￿ s contri-
bution, one would imagine that little more can be added that is signi￿cantly
enlightening. Yet, the problems raised by Sen remain as puzzles for liberal
approaches and although a number of solutions have been proposed, ￿There
seems every reason to doubt the possibility of a comprehensive and coherent
modern philosophy of liberalism￿(Dunne, [6], p.54, quoted in [20], p.1135).
This paper provides various addtional arguments and formal results that
throw new light on liberal approaches in social choice theory and political
philosophy, and it raises further doubts on liberalism by highlighting some
new paradoxes and inconsistencies, building on our own work in [13] and
[14]. To be speci￿c, we analyse two liberal principles suited to Bergson-
Samuelson Social Welfare Orderings (henceforth, SWOs), which are meant
to incorporate a liberal ethics of noninterference, whose intellectual origin can
be traced back to John Stuart Mill￿ s famous essay ￿ On Liberty￿ . Our analysis
aims to capture some of the fundamental insights of the Harm Principle,
which arguably lie at the core of all liberal approaches, namely the idea that
society should not interfere with individual choices whenever the latter have
no e⁄ect on others.
The Harm Principle is conceptually di⁄erent from Sen￿ s idea of minimal
liberty in two respects. First, personal autonomy is explicitly related to the
e⁄ects of individual choices on other people￿ s welfare. Second, it is explicitly
formulated as a negative freedom. Our axioms stipulate conditions under
2which agents have a power to veto society from expressing some preferences
that interfere with an agent￿ s personal sphere when nobody else is a⁄ected.
In its negative prescription, the Harm Principle arguably captures an even
more fundamental aspect of liberalism, and one that is often endorsed even
by people who do not subscribe to a liberal philosophy. For example, in
the Brundtland report, sustainable development is de￿ned as ￿development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their needs￿(Brundtland et al., 1987: 43; Wolf,
[31] provides a thorough analysis of intergenerational justice from a liberal
perspective).
The two axioms analysed in this paper capture di⁄erent aspects of non-
interfering views, but both lead to results that are problematic for liberal
theories. First, we consider the Individual Damage Principle, which embod-
ies a more limited version of noninterference and obtain an arguably coun-
terintuitive result: together with the standard axioms of Strong Pareto and
Anonymity, the Individual Damage Principle leads straight to the strongly
egalitarian leximin SWO. This result is interesting from both a formal and a
theoretical viewpoint, because the leximin SWO is characterised by appealing
to axioms without any clear egalitarian content.
Next, we extend our notion of noninterference and obtain a rather striking
impossibility result. Any SWO that satis￿es the standard axiom of Weak
Pareto Optimality and our general Principle of Non-Interference must be
dictatorial.
Thus, our analysis arguably identi￿es a deep and fundamental inconsis-
tency in liberal approaches: if the general Principle of Non-Interference is
adopted, an impossibility result emerges. However, even if the bite of nonin-
terference is signi￿cantly limited, and a possibility result obtains, the social
welfare ordering is not distinctly liberal. Indeed, as shown in [14], a sim-
ilar conclusion is obtained if a number of alternative ways of constraining
the Principle of Non-Interference are considered. Besides, it is unclear that
a convincing teoretical justi￿cation for such restrictions can be provided a
priori, from a liberal perspective.
We focus on societies with only two individuals but all results can be
generalised to economies with N > 2 agents (see, [13] and [14]. See also
[11] and [12], where economies with an in￿nite number of agents are also
analysed). We present here some new results and conceptual arguments, and
provide a number of new graphical proofs and examples.
The conclusions of the analysis may seem to lead to a dead end, and one
3may ask what is the solution to the inconsistencies in liberal thinking high-
lighted in this paper. However, ￿rst, these results ￿can also be interpreted as
guideposts to the creation of a more acceptable theory of liberal democracy￿
(Riley, [20], pp.1135-6). Second, following Sen ( [23], p.28), one may argue
that ￿there is nothing much to ￿ resolve￿anyway. The impossibility ... just
brings out a con￿ ict of principles ... The really interesting issues relate to the
implications of the con￿ ict. There are implications both for the evaluation
of outcomes and for choice of decision procedures￿ .
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the Indi-
vidual Damage Principle and Section 3 proves that, together with Anonymity
and Strong Pareto, it characterises the leximin SWO. Section 4 analyses the
Principle of Non-Interference and Section 5 proves that any weakly paretian
SWO that satis￿es the Principle of Non-Interference must be dictatorial.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Individual Damage Principle
To illustrate the basic idea behind the ￿rst liberal principle analysed in this
paper, called the Individual Damage Principle, we use a simple example.
Example 1 The Victorian library example
Consider a society with two agents, me and you, and consider the social
choice between two welfare pro￿les p and q. All entries in the table below,




Suppose that (for whatever reason) p is socially preferred to q.
Now consider a change to two di⁄erent pro￿les p0 and q0. In both of these





4Your welfare at p0 and q0 is identical to your welfare at p and q, respec-
tively. What should the social preference between p0 and q0 be?
We suggest that in any non-interfering view of society, the following ar-
gument should apply. I su⁄ered damage at p0 and q0 compared to p and q,
while you are exactly in the same conditions. The cause of such damage is
not clari￿ed. It might, or might not, have been a result of my negligence.
Perhaps it was just bad luck. Perhaps I did not work hard enough, or failed
to insure myself. What is for sure is that you were not involved either by
my bad luck or by my negligence. As far as you are concerned, the choice
between p and q is exactly the same as the choice between p0 and q0. So
society should not reverse the strict preference between p and q to a strict
preference for q0 over p0 (a switch to indi⁄erence is admitted). Switching the
social preference to q0 would imply a further damage for me in addition to
the loss of welfare, a social punishment. Not only did I lose welfare, but
the social choice moves against me in addition. But there is no information
whatever to justify such a punishment. In the absence of such a justi￿cation,
society should not interfere.
To see the implications of the Individual Damage principle, suppose that
the numerical example depicts social choice concerning access to public li-
braries in the Victorian era. Suppose that I enjoy reading, but I am relatively
poor and can only buy very few books: 10 is my welfare from situation p
where, among other things, access to public libraries is free, while 7 is my
welfare in situation q in which society takes an action that reduces my wel-
fare, such as a restriction of access to public libraries - either in the form of a
general policy (e.g. census-based membership, given that I am poor); or ad
hominem (e.g., directly against me, for whatever reason). All other things,
except access to libraries, are held constant at p and q.
Next, consider p0 and q0, and the corresponding welfare pro￿les, which
may arise in a number of possible ways: I may have lost my job, due to a
general economic downturn, and without any fault of my own; or my house
may have burnt down, and I had failed to insure myself; or perhaps I have
found ￿Lady Chatterley￿ s Lover￿ on a bench and read it. Then 8 is my
welfare in situation p0 in which I have access to libraries, while 6 is my
welfare in situation q0, in which society sanctions me - for being unemployed,
or for losing my house, or for reading the book - by restricting my access to
libraries. Note that my welfare decreases at p0 and q0: this is obvious if I have
been laid o⁄, or my house has burnt down, but it may also happen when I
5￿nd the book if, after reading it, I utterly dislike it.1 It is also important to
note that the book is not borrowed from the library and thus the decision
concerning access bears no direct relation with my reading the book. In any
case, the Individual Damage Principle stipulates that if society chose open
access when I was employed, or my house was still intact, or I had not read
the book, then my bad luck, or negligence, or even my action of reading the
book should not lead to a change in social preferences: in any case, I should
not be punished given that nobody￿ s welfare is involved. It is important to
note, though, that the principle is not liberal in the sense of prescribing that
access to public libraries be open, that is, the axiom does not require that p
be socially preferred to q.
Furthermore, the principle aims to capture only some aspects of nonin-
terfering views of society, and it does not impose any constraints on social
choice in a number of cases. If social preferences over p and q were di⁄erent,
then the principle would be silent. Maybe society should compensate me for
the loss by switching from a preference for q over p to a preference for p0 over
q0. But maybe not. Similarly, if I was better o⁄at q0 than at p0, the principle
would also be silent on whether I should be compensated by a switch in social
preferences to coincide with my own. Further, the principle is silent in cases
when your welfare changes, too: if you are a⁄ected, this may provide prima
facie ground for interference. But maybe not. Because we do not aim to
provide a complete liberal theory of government, the axiom is appropriately
silent on these controversial cases.2
To be sure, from a non-liberal perspective, there may be many reasons
to switch preferences against me: for instance, total or average utility may
now be lower at p0 than at q0, or maybe p0 may be more egalitarian than q0.
But all these statements incorporate nonliberal concerns, which we explicitly
1It may even be the case that, even if I enjoy the book, some of my acquaintances
decide to stop socialising with me, so that again the net e⁄ect of reading the book on
my welfare may be negative. In Mill￿ s analysis of the Harm Principle, generalised moral
reprovation and enforcement via moral coercion following my reading the book are not
justi￿ed, and the Harm Principle is meant to protect agents from the tyranny of public
opinion as much as from legal coercion. Yet, people have no duty to interact with me and
in reading the book I may incur ￿the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from
the unfavourable judgement of others￿(Mill, On Liberty, chapter IV; in [30]). It is worth
noting that people may decide to stop meeting me even if their welfare is not directly
a⁄ected by knowing that I read it.
2For a discussion of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for interference in classical
liberalism, see, e.g., Berger ([2]) and Rees ([19]).
6wish to set aside.
By imposing a restriction on society￿ s choices when individual actions and
events do not a⁄ect others, we believe that the Individual Damage Principle
incorporates a concern for negative freedom (from interference) with a clear
liberal content. Yet, given the relevance of nonwelfaristic concerns in liberal
approaches, it may be worth defending our choice to focus on a welfaristic
framework. The following arguments are also relevant for the discussion of
the principle of Non-Interference in section 4 below.
First, it is important to emphasise again that we do not aim to provide a
complete theory of liberalism, and our axioms capture only some implications
of liberal views. The axiom is formulated as a purely negative prescription:
it requires noninterference in a set of social settings, but it does not char-
acterise all the situations in which noninterference is morally required, and
thus it provides no guidance as to when interference is indeed legitimate.
Nonwelfaristic concerns are typically central in liberal theories in the treat-
ment of the latter problems, which involve issues such as, for example, the
distinction between the so-called ￿private and public versions of the harm
principle￿(Danley, [4], p.420) or the di⁄erence between harm caused by ac-
tion and harm caused by inaction (see, e.g., Berger, [2], p.255⁄). By assuming
that other agents￿welfare is constant, the axiom assumes all types of harm
away and makes the latter distinctions arguably less relevant in our analysis.
One of the main arguments against a purely welfaristic framework is that
not all losses in welfare count as harms, both in Mill￿ s approach and in
plausible versions of liberalism. For example, losses incurred as the e⁄ect
of the operation of competitive markets (with losers and winners) do not
count as harms in Mill (see, e.g., the discussion in Arneson, [1], section 1).
Although this point is important in general, it is unclear that it invalidates
our analysis, because our axioms state that if the welfare of all other agents
is unchanged - whatever the source of the change in one agent￿ s welfare - then
there is no ground for interference, in the sense of reversing social preferences.
Of course, there may be changes in the welfare of other agents that a liberal
would not count as harms and would not modify the conclusion that q0 should
not be strictly preferred to p0. However, given the purpose of our analysis, it
is desirable to have weaker axioms that rule out all welfare changes.3
3It is worth noting that if agent i￿ s welfare losses were caused by some other agents￿
choices, there may be some room for nonwelfaristic concerns. However, one may argue
that the existence of actions taken by agent j that a⁄ect agent i, but do not modify j￿ s
welfare at all, is highly implausible. Perhaps more importantly, even in such case, it would
7Second, even if liberal theories cannot be fully captured in a purely wel-
faristic framework, and typically involve issues of rights and entitlements,
welfare considerations arguably play a central role in the major approaches,
and the Harm Principle itself can be plausibly interpreted in welfaristic terms.
Although a thorough interpretation of the classic texts in liberal philosophy
is beyond the scope of this paper, some points are worth making here in
support of our welfaristic approach.
In the opening pages of his essay on liberty, J.S. Mill explicitly notes that
￿It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to
my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility￿
(On Liberty, Chapter I; p.136 in [30]). Even more explicitly, Mill goes on to
say that ￿I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but
it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests
of man as a progressive being￿(On Liberty, Chapter I; p.136 in [30]). And
although the consistency between his analysis of liberal principles and his
utilitarian approach has been questioned, a number of scholars have force-
fully argued that Mill is best interpreted as a ￿utilitarian liberal￿ (see, e.g.,
Wallack, [29], and the contributions in Gray and Smith, [8]). Furthermore,
in Mill￿ s own formulation, the Harm principle is concerned with actions that
a⁄ect other people￿ s welfare, and not only their rights or freedoms, and ￿the
formula ￿ coercion to prevent coercion￿used by some liberals is distinct from
Mill￿ s ￿ coercion to prevent harm￿ ￿(McCloskey, [16], p.147).
Despite the emphasis on rights, welfaristic considerations are central also
in entitlement theories of justice, and this is true in particular for those as-
pects that relate to noninterference. Consider, for example, the famous Lock-
ean proviso, according to which the initial acquisition of unowned resources
is justi￿ed as long as ￿ enough and as good is left for others￿of the resources
appropriated. Locke himself defends the relevance of the proviso by claim-
ing that, given the abundance of natural resources at his time, acquisition
could take place ￿without straitening anybody￿(quoted in Wolf, [31], p.798),
which naturally lends itself to a welfaristic interpretation. Miller ([15], p.406-
7) actually argues that the relevant part of the proviso is ￿ as good￿ , rather
than ￿ enough￿ , and that ￿ as good￿should be interpreted in welfaristic terms.
In Nozick￿ s theory, ￿the crucial point is whether an appropriation of an un-
owned object worsens the situation of others￿(Nozick, [18], p.175) and many
seem all the more desirable to impose that q0 be not strictly preferred to p0, as a minimal
requirement of justice.
8authors have argued that a welfaristic approach provides the most promising
interpretation of the proviso, which solves a number of conceptual di¢ cul-
ties, such as those related to heterogeneous land or to the rights of future
generations (see, e.g., Sanders, [21]; Wolf, [31]), which would make it vir-
tually impossible to satisfy the proviso.4 In general terms, the rationale of
the Lockean proviso may be stated as requiring that ￿no invididual be made
worse o⁄ (in some appropriate sense) by the appropriation (compared with
the situation before appropriation)￿(Vallentyne, [28], p.7).5
In sum, the point is not that a welfaristic framework captures all that is
relevant in a liberal, or libertarian, approach: this is, of course, untrue. It
seems, however, reasonable to say at least that a welfaristic interpretation of
liberal noninterfering views does capture many of the relevant issues at stake
and in the most plausible, and widespread, construals of liberal approaches,
welfare information plays a pivotal role in the analysis of noninterference.
A di⁄erent objection to our axiomatic treatment of noninterference is
worth noting here. It might be argued that all meaningful individual acts
have an e⁄ect on others, so that our axioms are empirically irrelevant (see,
e.g., the discussion in Rees, [19], p.171⁄). In Mill￿ s own words: ￿No person
is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything se-
riously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least
to his near connections, and often far beyond them￿(quoted in McCloskey,
[16], p.149). In the Victorian library example above, one may argue that
other agents - for example, people holding strong views on morals, - would
indeed be a⁄ected by my reading the book, or by my not having insured the
house, or maybe even by my being unemployed, and therefore their welfare
will not remain unchanged. This criticism is not speci￿cally aimed at our
axioms, though, and it is typically moved to all liberal views based on some
version of the Harm Principle. If correct, this critique would indeed be quite
damaging for liberal views but, if anything, from a theoretical viewpoint it
would reinforce our critical analysis. Perhaps more importantly, it is im-
4See, e.g., Miller([15], p.406⁄) and the discussion in Kymlicka([10], pp.308⁄). Sanders
actually argues that ￿Nozick suggests an interpretation that might make use of indi⁄erence
curves￿(Sanders, [21], p.380, fn.18).
5Interestingly, a welfaristic approach is even more cogent within the so-called left-
libertarian approaches, which strenghten the proviso by requiring that compensatory pay-
ments be made. See the contributions in Steiner and Vallentyne ([25]). See in particular,
Steiner ([24]) and Vallentyne￿ s ([28], pp.11⁄) discussion of the ￿ social fund￿to compensate
for the depletion of natural assets and of welfarism in left-libertarian views.
9portant to note that ours is a logical inquiry into the consistency of liberal
approaches, whereas the criticism focuses mostly on an empirical issue. From
a logical viewpoint, it is certainly possible to draw a meaningful distinction
between the two types of actions (viz., self-regarding vs. other-regarding)
and the idea that all conceivable acts have e⁄ects on others does not seem
plausible. Actually, many liberals have defended the view that an empirically
meaningful distinction exists.6
3 The ￿rst paradox: noninterference implies
equality
Let N be a 2￿agent society. Consider social welfare orderings < on R2, where
R is the set of real numbers and R2 denotes the set of welfare allocations in
this society. That is, if p 2 R2, then pi represents the welfare level of agent
i 2 N = f1;2g. The vector notation is: x > y (resp. x >> y) i⁄ xi ￿ yi for
all i and x 6= y (resp. i⁄ xi > yi for all i).
De￿ne the following two basic axioms for <, for all p;q 2 R2:
Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO): p > q ) p ￿ q:
Anonymity (A): p = ￿q for some permutation ￿ ) p ￿ q.
Next, we introduce the formal version of the Individual Damage Principle.
Starting from two welfare allocations p and q for which p is socially preferred
to q, consider two di⁄erent welfare allocations p0 and q0 such that agent i is
worse o⁄ at these than at the corresponding starting allocations, the other
agents are equally well o⁄, and agent i prefers p0 to q0. The principle requires
that society should not reverse the strict preference between p and q to a
strict preference for q0 over p0 (a switch to indi⁄erence is admitted):
Individual Damage Principle (IDP): Let p ￿ q, and let p0 and q0 be such
6See the discussion in Berger ([2], p.243⁄). One context in which the distinction
seems particularly meaningful concerns intergenerational justice since not all actions of
the present generation have e⁄ects on removed generations (certainly not on predecessors,
but possibly also on successors). For a discussion see McCloskey ([16]).









j for j 6= i
qj = q
0
j for j 6= i
Then p0 < q0 whenever p0
i > q0
i.
For any p 2 R2 let p denote the permutation of p such that the com-
ponents are ranked in ascending order, so that p1 is the welfare level of the
worst-o⁄ agent and p2 of the second worst-o⁄ agent.
De￿ne the leximin ordering <LM by:
p ￿
LM q , p1 > q1or p1 = q1 & p2 > q2
We can now show that the combination of Strong Pareto Optimality,
Anonymity, and the Individual Damage Principle characterises the leximin
ordering.7
Theorem 2 : A social ordering < satis￿es Strong Pareto Optimality, Anonymity
and the Individual Damage Principle if and only if it is the leximin ordering.
Proof: 1. (Necessity) As is well-known, the leximin satis￿es Strong
Pareto Optimality and Anonymity, so we only need to prove that it satis￿es
the Individual Damage Principle. Consider the following diagram, where any
point in the plane represents a welfare allocation to agents 1 and 2:
[Add Figure 1 about here.]
Without loss of generality, consider points p and q: p is strictly leximin
preferred to q, because the welfare of the worst o⁄agent is higher at p (agent
2) than at q (agent 1). It is immediately clear that any perturbation of p and
q such that the welfare of agent 1 (resp. agent 2) decreases in both allocations
but is higher at p0 than at q0 (resp. at p00 than at q00) implies that p0 is still
7We provide here a graphical proof of the Theorem. A full-￿ edged standard demonstra-
tion can be found in the appendix. A proof for societies with N agents was ￿rst derived
in [13] and later generalised in [11].
11strictly leximin preferred to q0 (resp. p00 is still strictly leximin preferred to
q00).
2. (Su¢ ciency) For any pairs of welfare allocations p and q, if p is leximin
indi⁄erent to q then p is a permutation of q and therefore the two vectors
are indi⁄erent by Anonymity. Therefore we only need to prove that if p is
strictly leximin preferred to q, then p is strictly socially preferred to q. The
result immediately follows by Strong Pareto (and Anonymity), if p Pareto-
dominates (the permutation of) q. Therefore suppose that p and (the per-
mutation of) q cannot be Pareto-ranked and suppose by contradiction that
p is strictly leximin preferred to q but q is strictly socially preferred to p. By
Anonymity, we can restrict attention to the case with: qi > pj ￿ pi > qj,
where i;j 2 f1;2g;i 6= j. Without loss of generality, suppose that p and q
are as shown in Figure 2.
[Add Figure 2 about here.]
Then, starting from p and q, it is possible to construct vectors p0 and q0
such that p0
1 = q2+", where " is an arbitrarily small number, and q0
1 = p2, such
that q0 is weakly socially preferred to p0 by the Individual Damage Principle,
but p0 is strictly socially preferred to q0 by Strong Pareto Optimality and
Anonymity. Therefore a contradiction is obtained.
Therefore it follows that if p is strictly leximin preferred to q, then q
cannot be strictly socially preferred to p. The possibility that q and p are
socially indi⁄erent is ruled out by noting that in this case it is possible to
slightly perturb p, to obtain a vector r such that r is strictly leximin preferred
to q, but q is strictly socially preferred to r (by Strong Pareto Optimality),
which we have ruled out.
The previous result is interesting for two reasons. Theoretically, from the
viewpoint of liberal approaches, it proves that an anonymous constitution
that satis￿es unanymity and a liberal criterion of noninterference leads to
egalitarian allocations. Formally, this result is surprising, because the In-
dividual Damage Principle has no obvious egalitarian content. To show the
latter point, our result should be compared with the classical characterisation
of the leximin ordering obtained by Hammond ([9]).8 Beside Anonymity and
Strong Pareto Optimality, his characterisation uses the axiom now usually
called Hammond Equity. This is a strongly egalitarian condition that can be
formally expressed as follows.
8See also the generalisation in Tungodden ([27]).
12Hammond Equity: If pi < qi < qj < pj for two pro￿les p and q 2 R2,
then q < p.
So one additional interesting implication of our result is that Hammond
Equity and the Individual Damage Principle are equivalent in the presence
of Anonymity and Strong Pareto Optimality. It is possible to show, however,
that, if Strong Pareto Optimality holds, then Hammond Equity implies the
Individual Damage Principle, but the converse does not hold.
Proposition 3 : Suppose that a social ordering < on R2 satis￿es Strong
Pareto Optimality. If it satis￿es Hammond Equity, then it satis￿es the Indi-
vidual Damage Principle, but the converse is not true.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 has two interesting implications. First, from a technical
viewpoint, it shows that our characterisation is not trivial: under Strong
Pareto, Hammond Equity is logically stronger than the Individual Damage
Principle.9 Second, as shown in the proof of the latter part of the statement,
the Individual Damage Principle has indeed no obvious egalitarian content,
as it is consistent (together with Strong Pareto Optimality) with some of the
least equitable social welfare orderings, such as the serial dictatorships. In
this sense, together with Theorem 2, Proposition 3 clearly demonstrates the
ethical relevance of the axiom of Anonymity and the normative strength of
conceptions of justice as impartiality.
4 The Principle of Non-Interference
The egalitarian implications of the Individual Damage Principle are coun-
terintuitive and pose a challenge to liberal approaches. It may be argued,
however, that the Individual Damage Principle captures only some of the in-
tuititions behind the Harm principle, and the egalitarian implications would
disappear in a more general framework. In this section, we address this issue
and extend our analysis of the liberal notion of noninterference.
9It is worth noting that an analogous result can be proved for transitive social welfare
relations, without assuming completeness. However, the proof of Proposition 3 does not
hold for societies with more than two agents and thus we cannot claim that Hammond
Equity is in general stronger than the Individual Damage Principle under Strong Pareto
Optimality.
13In our framework, the core of Non-Interference is the following idea: an
individual has the right to make society remain passive in all circumstances
of change in his welfare, with the only exception of those circumstances in
which the welfare of other individuals is also a⁄ected. Non-Interference says
in particular that changes in one individual￿ s welfare that leave all other
individuals una⁄ected should not constitute a motivation for penalising the
individual in the social welfare judgement, whether the change involves a
damage or a bene￿t for him. By ￿ penalising￿we simply mean a switch in
society￿ s strict rankings of social alternatives against the individual, with
respect to the ranking of the original alternatives (before the adverse or
bene￿cial change for the individual under consideration occurred).
To illustrate concretely how Non-Interference works, consider again the
two-person example discussed in section 2 above.
Example 4 The Victorian library example reconsidered




Suppose that p is socially preferred to q.
Now consider a change to two di⁄erent pro￿les p0 and q0 which a⁄ects only
me. In both of these new pro￿les, I have either su⁄ered a damage or gained
a bene￿t, compared to the corresponding pro￿les p and q. You, instead,
enjoy exactly the same welfare levels at p0 and q0 as you enjoyed at p and q,
respectively:
Me You
p0 10 + " ￿
q0 7 + "0 ￿
In the table above, " and "0 are positive or negative numbers such that
sign(") = sign("0).
What should the social preference between p0 and q0 be? The ethical argu-
ments provided in section 2 above to defend the Individual Damage Principle
seem to extend quite naturally to the latter example: Non-Interference says
that it should not reverse the strict preference between p and q to a strict
14preference for q0 over p0 (a switch to indi⁄erence is admitted), possibly except
when I prefer otherwise. Non-Interference is silent on what should actually
happen if I prefer q0 over p0.10 In other words, I can veto society from switch-
ing its strict preferences after a change that a⁄ects only me and nobody else.
The fact that society is allowed to switch from a strict preference for p over
q to an indi⁄erence between p0 and q0 even when 10 + " > 7 + "0 (i.e. I
strictly prefer p0 over q0) makes my veto power, and hence Non-Interference,
relatively mild.
To illustrate the axiom, suppose again that the above example describes
social choice over library access in the Victorian era. If sign(") = sign("0) <
0, then we are back to the situation described in section 2 above, where the
change in welfare arises from losing a job, without any fault of my own; or
from failing to insure myself against my house burning down; or from ￿nding
on a bench and reading ￿Lady Chatterley￿ s Lover￿ . (Observe how we allow
for a di⁄erent disutility from punishment in the SWO depending on whether
I su⁄er a damage or not, a feature that stands to reason.) The axiom, how-
ever, now encompasses the possibility that my welfare increases at p0 and q0
compared with p and q, so that sign(") = sign("0) > 0 : maybe I won a lot-
tery; or I have ￿nally been able to solve a di¢ cult mathematical problem; or
I have found on a bench ￿Lady Chatterley￿ s Lover￿and thouroughly enjoyed
reading it. Then 10+" is my welfare in situation p0 in which I have access to
libraries, while 7+"0 is my welfare in situation q0, in which society sanctions
me - for winning the lottery, or for solving the mathematical problem, or
for reading the book - by restricting my access to libraries.11 In any case,
the Principle of Non-Interference stipulates that if society chose open access
when I had not won the lottery, or the problem was still unsolved, or I had
not read the book, my good luck, or e⁄ort, or even my action of reading the
book should not lead to a change in social preferences: in any case, I should
not be punished given that nobody￿ s welfare is involved. Again, the princi-
ple is not liberal in the sense of prescribing that access to public libraries be
open, that is, the axiom does not require that p be socially preferred to q.
As already noted, the principle of noninterference does not aim to provide
a complete description of liberal, noninterfering approaches to social choice,
10A hard-minded application of the underlying philosophy might suggest that p0 should
still be preferred to q0: but for our purposes (an impossibility result), as we shall see, it
would be pointless, while possible, to strenghten the principle in this way.
11Again, we assume that the book is not borrowed from the library and thus the decision
concerning access bears no direct relation with my reading the book.
15yet it is clearly more general than the Individual Damage Principle analysed
in sections 2 and 3 above. In particular, it arguably captures some relevant
liberal ethical intuitions more thoroughly and, although it seems interesting
enough on its own merits to warrant investigation, we shall highlight its
theoretical relations with some prominent liberal approaches.
First of all, in our opinion, the principle of Non-Interference translates
faithfully the substantial aspects of J.S. Mill￿ s ￿ Harm Principle￿ , notably when
he says:
￿The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others...The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.￿ (On Liberty, Chapter I;
p.135 in [30]).
In our framework, ￿ exercising power...against his will￿corresponds to so-
ciety switching its ranking in a way contrary to the individual￿ s welfare. It is
hard to deny that any exercise of power against one￿ s own will has precisely
this welfare consequence.
Mill￿ s description of the Harm Principle is couched in agency terms, e.g.
￿The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec-
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection.￿(On Liberty, Chapter I, our italics; p.135 in [30]).12
The agency aspect is obviously lost in a welfaristic framework, but, as
argued in section 2 above, this is not essential to our analysis of the Harm
Principle, especially if one notes that all relevant forms of interference will
have some welfare implications. Besides, as already noted, we only aim
to capture some aspects of the Harm Principle, and our axioms rule out
interference only in a core of social situations, namely when interference
decreases agents￿welfare. As shown in the Victorian library example, a
switch in social preferences over library access certainly represents a relevant
form of interference, which would diminish my welfare. The Principle of Non-
Interference does capture an essential aspect of Mill￿ s view by requiring that
if society adopted a liberal policy at p against q, then no switch in social
preferences should occur following my decisions or acts, given that the latter
12In the general context of Mill￿ s theory, self-protection is not to be interpreted literally,
and may be extensively understood to refer to well-being and not strictly to physical
integrity only.
16do not in￿ uence anyone else. According to Mill, ￿he already bears, or will
bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement,
we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it further￿(On Liberty, Chapter
IV; p.210 in [30]). And a similar principle applies, in a liberal perspective,
to welfare-enhancing decisions, acts, or events that do not a⁄ect others.
Secondly, the Principle of Non-Interference is relevant for libertarian ap-
proaches, too. In general, protection from interference is central for such
approaches, for it is the essential ingredient of (legitimately acquired) pri-
vate property, and negative rights (such as those incorporated in our axiom)
are foundational in libertarian notions of justice (Wolf, [31] p.793; Arneson,
[1], p.322). Indeed, in Locke￿ s theory, noninterference on property follows
from noninterference on people￿ s individual attributes and choices, as it de-
rives from the rights correlated to self-ownership. Non-Interference is also
implicated in the transfer of property: voluntary transactions (without ex-
ternalities) do not cause harm and therefore the state should not interfere.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly for our paper, the principle
of Non-Interference touches on the very moral legitimacy of the institution of
private property in a libertarian perspective, because of its relevance for the
just initial acquisition of resources. In Locke￿ s ￿ labour theory of property￿ ,
the initial appropriation of natural resources in the state of nature, which
gives rise to the institution of private property, is legitimate if (i) one mixes
one￿ s labour with unowned goods; (ii) one does not appropriate an amount
of things in excess of those one can use, so that they do not rot or get wasted;
and, as already noted, (iii) a proviso is satis￿ed, namely that ￿ there is enough
and as good left for others￿of the resources appropriated. Recent discussions
on Locke and on neo-Lockean theories, however, suggest that that the force of
entitlement theories of justice stems from the proviso (iii), suitably modi￿ed,
rather than the other conditions.13 In particular, as concerns (ii), libertarians
consider it an unjusti￿ed limitation of the rights associated with ownership
(which normally include the possibility of disposing of the good, consuming
it, and even destroying it), and this seems especially unsatisfactory if the
proviso holds, so that destroying the good cannot harm anybody.14
13See, e.g., Nozick ([18]), Kymlicka ([10]), and Arneson ([1]). As for (i), Nozick forcefully
argues that mixing one￿ s labour with natural resources has not much moral force in terms
of justifying private ownership especially if the only ￿ labour￿performed is the acquisition
itself. For the opposite view, see Sanders ([21]).
14Interestingly, when Locke argues that condition (ii) does not apply to monetary
economies he states that ￿a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use
17The force of the proviso itself derives from its being an application of
the Harm Principle: if there is enough and as good left for others, then
appropriation cannot possibly harm them, and thus nobody can complain or
demand ￿ interference￿on property claims.15 As persuasively stated by Wolf
([31], p.795), ￿The proviso functions to stipulate conditions in which this
presumptive claim [a claim to property] will be undefeated, or overrriding,
and will therefore impose duties of noninterference on others￿ . Therefore,
although we do not aim to capture all relevant aspects of entitlement theories
of justice, it is possible to provide one plausible interpretation of the above
conditions in our welfaristic framework that highlights the relevance of our
Principle of Non-Interference for some core issues in libertarian approaches.
In a welfaristic framework, the proviso may be reformulated as requiring
that nobody￿ s welfare is (negatively) a⁄ected by appropriation. Thus the
strong libertarian proviso might seem to be a variant of the strong pareto
principle: in the Lockean state of nature, let p be the welfare pro￿le of
all agents when private acquisition of some resource is allowed and let q
be the welfare pro￿le of all agents when it is not. Then, the welfaristic
lockean proviso could be interpreted as stating that private acquisition is
legitimate if p > q (this could be imagined as the outcome of a sequential
process in which one analyses private acquisition by one agent at a time and
a series of pareto-improving acquisitions take place; if some acquisition is
not pareto-improving - there is not ￿ enough and as good￿- left for others,
then the process stops and private property is not legitimate). The parallel
is imperfect, though, because what is required is that no other agent is
harmed, but the appropriating agent may as well be worse o⁄: this would
not decrease the legitimacy of the acquisition.16 At any rate, the strength of
our Principle of Non-Interference is that we need not be involved into this
discussion: whatever the libertarian criteria that may lead to p ￿ q, the
Principle of Non-Interference (as applied in the Lockean state of nature) can
be seen as a weak libertarian claim (or proviso): suppose the choice between
p and q in the numerical examples above, is a choice between allowing me to
appropriate a natural resource (p), or not (q), in Locke￿ s state of nature, in
the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be
hoarded up without injury to anyone￿(quoted in Miller, [15], p.407, italics added).
15See, e.g., Gibbard ([7], pp.28-30); Cohen ([3], p.256); Kymlicka ([10], p.308); and
Arneson ([1], pp.329-330).
16This raises the issue of why the agent appropriates the resource, given that she is
worse o⁄, but this has nothing to do with legitimacy.
18which economic interaction is presumably limited. For example, I grab a lot
of land and then subsist on it. If, consistently with Locke￿ s view, p ￿ q, then
it follows that whatever I get from the resource, or whatever luck (misfortune)
I have with it, if the Lockean proviso holds, and thus nobody else is a⁄ected
by my decisions (due to the limited interactions in the state of nature), and
if p0
i > q0
i it should certainly be p0 < q0, i.e., if I still prefer to appropriate the
resource, society should not actively prevent me from doing it. Given the
arguments concerning the Lockean criterion (ii) above, the legitimacy of my
acquisition would not be diminished by my spoiling or depleting the resource,
and thus no assumptions need be made concerning the source of change in
welfare from p;q to p0;q0.17
In our opinion, the latter arguments support the idea that the Principle of
Non-interference captures some essential aspects of liberal views. This view
is not uncontroversial, though, and some important criticisms of the social
choice interpretation of rights have been put forward. According to one of the
most prominent critics, liberal views require a purely procedural formulation
of rights and thus cannot be captured in a social choice theoretic framework,
and especially in a welfaristic context (Sugden, [26]). A thorough discussion
of Sugden￿ s interesting arguments goes beyond the scope of this paper, but
we note here that they are arguably not conclusive. On the one hand, his
interpretation of Mill as developing a theory of rights, and in particular of the
right to a personal sphere (see Sugden, [26], p.128) is disputable. As argued
above, it is doubtful that a close reading of Mill￿ s texts would support this
interpretation and there are many passages in which Mill explicitly rejects
this view.18
On the other hand, the defence of a purely procedural formulation of
rights is arguably weak and incomplete. It is incomplete because, even in
purely deontological approaches such as Nozick￿ s, considerations about out-
comes are kicked out of the door just to come back from the window: the
17Given its welfarist structure and given its silence on the reasons why p ￿ q in the
antecedent, the Principle of Non-Interference allows us to eschew all discussions of the
baseline model against which to analyse appropriation in the state of nature. Various
authors criticise Nozick for illegitimately restricting the proviso by comparing private
ownership only to the alternative of no-ownership (instead of, say, common ownership
and productive use) of resources (e.g., Cohen, [3]). Our Principle of Non-Interference is
silent on the ￿ underlying structure￿of q, instead.
18The main quote from Mill used by Sugden to support his argument, for example, is
arguably taken out of the context (see Sugden, [26], p.131).
19Lockean proviso is the best example (see the discussion above for more exam-
ples). It is weak because Sugden ([26], p.136) grants that Sen￿ s objections to
procedural approaches are relevant and in his reply to Sen￿ s ￿ Donna, Charles,
and Ali￿famous example, Sugden does not defend the absolute importance
of constraints (against Sen￿ s advocacy of trade-o⁄s) with a direct ethical ar-
gument, but only by invoking second-order prudential arguments, such as
the possibility that people are self-serving or self-deluding, or that they over-
estimate dangers, etc. leading to violations of rights based on welfare con-
siderations that turn out to be false ex post (see, for instance, Sugden, [26]
pp.142 and 148). Even if correct, this does not provide a ￿rst-order ethical
argument and if the second-order prudential factors are not relevant (which
is only an empirical matter), there remains no ethical defence of rights.
5 The second paradox: the impossibility of
non-interference
We shall now substantially weaken the axioms of Strong Pareto and Anonymity,
and replace them with the following basic properties for <, for all p;q 2 R2:
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): p >> q ) p ￿ q:
Non-Dictatorship (ND): For all i 2 N, there are p;q 2 R2 such that
pi > qi and q < p.
Next, we introduce the formal version of the Principle of Non-Interference.
Starting from two welfare allocations p and q for which p is socially preferred
to q, consider two di⁄erent welfare allocations p0 and q0 such that agent i is
either worse o⁄, or better o⁄, at these than at the corresponding starting
allocations, the other agents are equally well o⁄, and agent i prefers p0 to q0.
The principle requires that society￿ s preference over p0 and q0 should agree
with person i￿ s preferences.









j for j 6= i
qj = q
0
j for j 6= i
Then p0 < q0 whenever p0
i > q0
i.
20In other words, I can veto society from switching its strict preferences
after a change that a⁄ects only me and nobody else. The fact that society
is allowed to switch from a strict preference for p over q to an indi⁄erence
between p0 and q0 even when I strictly prefer p0 over q0 makes my veto power,
and hence Non-Interference, relatively mild.
We can now show that the conditions de￿ned so far are incompatible.19
Theorem 5 : There is no social ordering < that satis￿es Weak Pareto Op-
timality, Non-Dictatorship, and Non-Interference.
Proof: Consider the following diagram, where any point in the plane
represents a welfare allocation to agents 1 and 2. By Nondictatorship, there
are at least two pairs of allocations (x;y) and (p;q) such that if agent 1
strictly prefers y to x, x is weakly socially preferred to y; and if agent 2
strictly prefers p to q, q is weakly socially preferred to p. By Weak Pareto
Optimality, social preferences among the two pairs of alternatives can be
taken to be strict, and it can be assumed that agent 2 strictly prefers x to y,
and agent 1 strictly prefers q to p, without loss of generality. Suppose that
the two pairs of allocations are as depicted in Figure 3.
[Add Figure 3 about here.]
It is possible to perturb p and q as shown in Figure 3 so that q0 is weakly
socially preferred to p0 by Non-Interference (only agent 1￿ s welfare is a⁄ected
and she strictly prefers q0 to p0). Similarly, it is possible to perturb x and
y as shown in Figure 3 so that x0 is weakly socially preferred to y0 by Non-
Interference (only agent 2￿ s welfare is a⁄ected and she strictly prefers x0 to y0).
However, p0 strictly pareto dominates x0 and y0 strictly pareto dominates q0.
Therefore a contradiction is obtained because q0 is weakly socially preferred
to p0 which is strictly socially preferred to x0 (by Weak Pareto Optimality),
and x0 is weakly socially preferred to y0 which is strictly socially preferred to
q0 (by Weak Pareto Optimality).
It easy to show that starting from any initial con￿guration of vectors
p;q;x;y, a contradiction is obtained with a similar reasoning.
19We provide here a graphical proof of the Theorem. A standard demonstration can be
found in the appendix.
21Remark 1 It is worth noting that completeness is not necessary to prove
Theorem 5, which can be strengthened to apply to all transitive social welfare
relations.
In order to illustrate the logic of the impossibility result, consider the
following two-person example.
Example 6 The neighbouring desert islands
Suppose that Andrea is young, vegetarian, and loves meeting new people
(but she does not wish to live with anyone), whereas Bob is middle-aged
and does not enjoy company, but has a passion for ￿shing. They live in
two di⁄erent islands and each of them is the only inhabitant of their island.
The two islands are su¢ ciently far apart that neither of them can see what
the other is doing, but they are su¢ ciently close that a number of decisions
must be taken collectively. Consider ￿rst social choice between two welfare
pro￿les p and q, where the only di⁄erence between the two allocations is that
in q a boat with a large number of young people partying is allowed to sail
along the canal separating the two islands, whereas in p it is barred from the
canal. Given their preferences, and all other things equal, we assume that




Suppose that q is (strictly) socially preferred to p.
Consider next social choice between two welfare pro￿les x and y, where
the only di⁄erence between the two allocations is that in x empty beer bottles
cannot be thrown in the open sea, whereas in y all sorts of rubbish can be
freely disposed of in the canal. Given their preferences, and all other things





22Suppose that x is (strictly) socially preferred to y.
Note that the assumption that q is socially preferred to p and that x is
socially preferred to y entail no loss of generality because by Nondictatorship
(and Weak Pareto) two such pairs will always exist. Now consider a change
from welfare pro￿les p and q to two di⁄erent pro￿les p0 and q0 which a⁄ects
only Andrea: maybe she has casually found a hidden cave to explore in
her island, or - after a long series of experiments - she has found a way of
producing an alcoholic drink from a plant growing in her island, so that her
welfare has increased compared to the corresponding pro￿les p and q. Bob,
instead, enjoys exactly the same welfare levels at p0 and q0 which he enjoyed




Similarly, consider a change from welfare pro￿les x and y to two di⁄erent
pro￿les x0 and y0 which a⁄ects only Bob: maybe he has found a hidden
mountain lake with a large stock of ￿sh, or maybe he has invented a new
portable chair that allows him to ￿sh more comfortably. In both of these new
pro￿les, his welfare has increased, compared to the corresponding pro￿les x
and y. Andrea, instead, enjoys exactly the same welfare levels at x0 and y0




The impossibility result can now be illustrated. Since q is (strictly) so-
cially preferred to p, then by Non-Interference, q0 is (weakly) socially pre-
ferred to p0. Then by Weak Pareto Optimality, p0 is (strictly) socially pre-
ferred to x0. Finally, since x is (strictly) socially preferred to y, then by
Non-Interference, x0 is (weakly) socially preferred to y0. But then, since by
Weak Pareto Optimality y0 is (strictly) socially preferred to q0, the desired
contradiction obtains.
In order to appreciate the strength of our result, it is worth comparing it
with Sen￿ s ([22]) classic contribution. In Sen￿ s ([22]) Minimal Liberty axiom,
the core of liberalism is formalised as the requirement that an individual has
a sphere of complete control on society￿ s preferences over minimal subsets
23of social states. The characteristics of the social states are not speci￿ed,
however, and in this sense the Minimal Liberty axiom cannot capture Mill￿ s
Harm Principle; for no mention is made of other agents￿welfare and the
notion of personal autonomy is not explicitly related to the idea of no harm
to others.
Conceptually, Sen￿ s ML captures individual autonomy by de￿ning a sphere
of ￿ positive￿freedom, overriding in principle concerns about other people￿ s
welfare. This is an important di⁄erence from our Principle of NonInterfer-
ence, which embodies a notion of personal autonomy in terms of negative
freedom, namely as the protection from interference under certain circum-
stances not involving others. This characteristic of NI is even more trans-
parent if one notes that the consequent of NI might equivalently be written
as requiring q0 ￿ p0 whenever p0
i > q0
i. Similarly, if Sen￿ s Minimal Liberty
axiom is understood as a ￿social choice formulation of rights￿(Sugden, [26],
p.128⁄), then it can be interpreted as assuming the existence of a personal
sphere over which individuals have a right to have their preferences respected.
In the language of rights, the Principle of NonInterference would capture a
di⁄erent, and arguably weaker type of right, namely the right to be protected
from adverse changes in strict social preferences.
Formally, one way to read NI is as ￿ local decisiveness￿condition. Sen￿ s
￿ minimal liberalism￿ , for example, asserts that an individual i must be de-
cisive at least on one pair of alternatives. NI asserts that an individual i
must be decisive on every pair of alternatives that is reached through certain
￿ precedents￿(society has already demonstrated a strict preference between
p and q and the only change involved concerns i alone). The individual is
decisive not because of the nature of the alternatives but on the basis of the
ranking of society itself in another situation which is identical to the one
under consideration when seen from the viewpoint of all other members of
society. Once again, observe how the required individual￿ s decisiveness is
weak since she cannot prevent society￿ s indi⁄erence in the face of her strict
preference.
6 Concluding remarks
We formalise and study principles of noninterference applied to social wel-
fare orderings. The Principle of Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal
approaches to social decision making. Broadly speaking, it requires that an
24individual has the right to make society remain passive in all circumstances
of change in his welfare, with the only exception of those circumstances in
which the welfare of other individuals is also a⁄ected. In its full generality,
NI produces an impossibility result: in fact, together with Pareto Optimal-
ity, it implies that a Social Welfare Ordering must be dictatorial. However,
by restricting the direction of the allowed changes in circumstance, we can
characterise the Leximin Social Welfare Ordering which satis￿es, in addition
to Pareto Optimality, also Anonymity. Actually, as shown in Mariotti and
Veneziani ([14]), di⁄erent restrictions on the form of these changes allow us
to characterise the leximax, the Utilitarian and the Nash orderings.
This highlights a deep inconsistency in liberal approaches. On the one
hand, if a general view of noninterference is held, then an impossibility re-
sult emerges. We take this result as a demonstration that it is impossible to
make social welfare judgements without considering the distributional con-
sequences of changes in welfare, even when those changes a⁄ect only one
individual. There cannot be any ￿ protected sphere￿for the individual in this
sense. Of the appeals of the individuals to be left alone because ￿ nobody
but me has been a⁄ected￿ , at least some will necessarily have to be over-
ruled. On the other hand, even if the bite of noninterference is restricted,
and possibility results are derived, then social welfare orderings obtained are
not recognisably, or distinctly, liberal.
7 Appendix: Formal Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2: If. We verify only that the leximin ordering satis￿es
the IDP. Suppose p ￿LM q and consider p0;q0 with q0
i < p0
i, p0
i < pi, q0
i < qi,
some i 2 N, and pj = p0
j and qj = q0
j, j 6= i: We prove that p0 ￿LM q0.
Note ￿rst that if it was q0
j ￿ p0
j, then p0 would Pareto dominate q0 and
the conclusion would be reached immediately. So in what follows assume
q0
j > p0
j. Therefore we have q0
j = qj > p0
j = pj. Furthermore, if qi > p0
j = pj,






Given that qi > q0











Only if. Let a social ordering < satisfy the axioms and let p;q 2 R2 with
p 6= q. If p ￿LM q then pi = qj, i 6= j, and it follows immediately by A that
25p ￿ q. So we show that p ￿LM q implies that p ￿ q. If p Pareto dominates
q we are done by SPO. If p Pareto dominates the permutation of q then we
are done by A and SPO. So let pi 6= qj, i 6= j, and suppose by contradiction
that p ￿LM q but q ￿ p. Without loss of generality, let
p1 > q2
q1 > p2
Let " 2 R+. De￿ne p0 = (p0
1;p0




a) q2 ￿ q1. In view of the displayed inequalities it follows that p1 > q2 ￿
q1 > p2, contradicting the assumption p ￿LM q.
b) p1 ￿ p2 and q1 > q2. As by assumption p1 > q2 it follows that
p2 ￿ p1 > q2. For a su¢ ciently small ", by the IDP q ￿ p implies q0 < p0,
whereas by A and SPO it must be p0 ￿ q0, contradiction.
c) p1 > p2 and q1 > q2. Then p ￿LM q implies p2 ￿ q2. If it was p2 = q2
then p ￿LM q would imply p1 > q1. This yields p1 > q1 > p2 ￿ q2 and p
would Pareto dominate q, contradicting q ￿ p. So let p2 > q2: if p1 ￿ q1 a
contradiction would immediately obtain. Therefore let q1 > p1 and, by A, it
is possible to repeat the reasoning of the previous case.
This shows that it must be p < q whenever p ￿LM q. If p ￿ q, it is
possible to slightly reduce the welfare of one of two agents to obtain r close
enough to p such that r ￿LM q but (by SPO) q ￿ r, and the argument above
can be applied to r and q, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:20 1. Consider two vectors p;q 2 R2. Without
loss of generality, assume q2 > q1:
Case (i). Suppose p > q. By SPO p ￿ q and it is easy to check that for
any p0, q0 2 R2 such that p0
i < pi, q0
i < qi, and pj = p0
j, qj = q0
j for j 6= i;if
p0
i > q0
i then p0 ￿ q0 by SPO.
Case (ii). Suppose q1 < p1 ￿ p2 < q2. By HE and SPO, it is immediate
to prove that it must be p ￿ q. Consider p0, q0 2 R2 such that p0
2 < p2,
q0
2 < q2, and p1 = p0
1, q1 = q0
1: if p0
2 > q0
2 then p0 ￿ q0 by SPO. Consider p0,
q0 2 R2 such that p0
1 < p1, q0
1 < q1, and p2 = p0




HE p0 < q0.
20We thank Michele Lombardi for various suggestions that have greatly improved the
proof.
26Case (iii). Suppose q1 < p2 < p1 ￿ q2. Again, by HE and SPO, it must
be p ￿ q and the rest of the proof follows as in the previous case except for
the following combination: q0
1 < p2 ￿ p0
1 < q2. Yet, by HE and SPO it is
immediate to prove that in the latter case, too, it must be p0 ￿ q0.
Case (iv). Suppose q1 < p2 < q2 < p1. By HE and SPO, it is immediate
to prove that it must be p ￿ q. Consider p0, q0 2 R2 such that p0
2 < p2,
q0
2 < q2, and p1 = p0
1, q1 = q0
1: if p0
2 > q0
2 then again p0 ￿ q0 by SPO. Consider
p0, q0 2 R2 such that p0
1 < p1, q0
1 < q1, and p2 = p0





1 < p2 < q2 < p0
1 the proof that p0 ￿ q0 follows as at the beginning of this
case. If q0
1 < p2 < p0
1 ￿ q2 the proof that p0 ￿ q0 follows as at the beginning
of case (iii). If q0
1 < p0
1 ￿ p2 < q2 then by SPO and HE, it must be p0 ￿ q0.
Cases (v) and (vi). If q1 = p2 < p1 ￿ q2 or q1 = p2 < q2 < p1, it is easily
checked that IDP holds in these cases, too.
Finally, all other con￿gurations of p;q 2 R2 are dealt with using sym-
metrical arguments.
2. We want to show that there exists a SWO < on R2 that satis￿es SPO
and IDP but not HE. Consider the following lexicographically dictatorial
SWO <LD by p ￿LD q , p = q and p ￿LD q , p1 > q1 or p1 = q1 & p2 > q2:
<LD satis￿es IDP and SPO but not HE.
Proof of Theorem 5: 1. Consider p;q 2 R2, p 6= q, such that pi > qi.
If q < p, then by WPO it is immediate to prove that there exist p0;q0 2 R2,




j, and q0 ￿ p0.
2. By ND and step 1, there exist p;q 2 R2 such that p1 < q1, p2 > q2,
and q ￿ p. By ND and step 1 above, there also exist x;y 2 R2 such that
x1 < y1, x2 > y2, and x ￿ y. We show that there exist vectors p0;q0,x0;y0
such that q0 < p0, x0 < y0, p0 >> x0, and y0 >> q0 .
3. There are in principle a number of cases to consider. Case (i): suppose
that x1 > p1, x2 < p2, y1 > q1, and y2 < q2. Then it is possible to construct
two vectors x0;y0 such that x2 < x0
2 < p2, y2 < q2 < y0
2, x1 = x0




2: by NI, it follows that x0 < y0. Then, construct two vectors
p0;q0, such that p0
1 > x0
1 = x1 > p1, y0
1 = y1 > q0
1 > q1, p0
2 = p2, q0
2 = q2, and
q0
1 > p0
1: by NI, it follows that q0 < p0. Furthermore, by WPO, it follows that
p0 ￿ x0 and y0 ￿ q0, yielding the desired contradiction.
4. It is easily checked that starting from any initial con￿guration of the
vectors p;q,x;y , a contradiction is obtained with a similar reasoning in a
￿nite number of steps using NI and WPO.
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30Figure 1: Leximin - Necessity
Agent 2 45˚ line
   q2 = q'2 q'       q
   p2 = p'2      p'       p
         p''2     p''
         q''2      q''
   q'1   p'1   q1 = q''1   p1 = p''1 Agent 1Figure 2: Leximin - Sufficiency
Agent 2 45˚ line
   p2 = p'2   p'       p
   q2 = q'2  q'         q
       p'1    p1        q'1    q1 Agent 1Figure 3: The impossibility of NonInterference
Agent 2
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